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William M. Arnett
Two of the most controversial and provocative writers in our
time have been the German-born theologians, Rudolf Bultmann and Paul
Tillich. Their writings reflect the strong influence of, and give
impetus to, the movement called "existentialism"-a word that is
frequently used and variously defined in recent years. It should not
be inferred, however, that both men share the same point of view.
Bultmann, for example, has criticized Tillich 's view as less Chris-
tological and more philosophical, while one critic observes that
Bultmann promotes independence of all philosophy, with the ex
ception of existentialism.
Bultmann very readily fits into the category of the existential
ists, since his theology may be regarded as a synthesis of elements
from S^ren Kierkegaard, the "father" of present-day existentialism,
and Martin Heidegger, his atheistic colleague for many years at the
University of Marburg. Bultmann states quite frankly that an exis
tentialist interpretation of the Bible is the only solution whereby the
Christian faith can become understandable and acceptable to modern
man.l He calls his principle of biblical interpretation existential
hermeneutics . . . because the Bible is found to appeal to the same
dimensions of depth and self-understanding in men to which existen
tial philosophy appeals. "^
It is more difficult to classify Tillich theologically, though he
is often called an existentialist�a characterization which he has
1. Rudolf Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology," in Kerygma and
Myth, ed. Werner Bartsch (London: S PC K, 1953), p. 15.
2. Carl Michalson, "Rudolf Bultmann," in Ten Makers of Modern Pro
testant Thought, ed. Geroge L. Hunt (New York: Association Press
1958), p. 104.
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personally affirmed^ and rejected. 4 Walter Leibrecht states that
Tillich has become "the theologian for Everyman in the predicament
of his existence. "5 He observes that Tillich is an ontologist in
quiring into the meaning of Being, an existentialist exploring man's
anxiety about "-he meaningfulness of his own existence, an idealist
who sees man s spiritual problem as calling for a return of the soul
from estrangement to its true essence, and a romanticist who uses
his creative spirit to re-interpret the symbols of traditional religion
in an effort to make their truth meaningful to the perplexed.^ Actually
Tillich prefers to call himself an "ecstatic naturalist," stating
emphatically that "... 1 have fought supranaturalism from my early
writings on, not in order to support naturalism but because I tried
to overcome the alternative between naturalism and supranaturalism."^
Notwithstanding the divergent views of Bultmann and Tillich,
there are a number of similarities between the two scholars. A
strong existentialist element is evident, for example, in that both
reject any knowledge of God that is objective to personal decision.
Respecting anthropology, Bultmann says Tillich and he concur.
Both men have sharply accommodated Christianity to a modern
philosophy of science. Both scholars are known for their antipathy
to the supernatural element in the Christian faith. The tendency of
both, however, is to be more biblical and theological in their ser
mons than in their systematic theology.^ The theology of Bultmann
3. "His classification as an existentialist is much less clear. Never
theless, there seem to be good reasons for placing him under this
heading, especially since he sometimes classifies himself in this
way." John B. Cobb, Jr., Living Options in Protestant Theology
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1962), p. 259. This is an
observation from Paul Tillich's article, "Metaphysics and Theology,"
in Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 10, 1956, p. 63.
4. "... I can only pose the question of a possible philosophical foun
dation for psychotherapy on the basis of my own thought, in which
the existential element has a definite place, although I would not
call myself an existentialist." "Existentialism, Psychotherapy, and
the Nature of Man," in Pastoral Psychology, Vol. 11, No. 105, June,
1960, p. 10.
5. "The Life and Mind of Paul Tillich," in Religion and Culture, Essays
in Honor of Paul Tillich, ed. Walter Leibrecht (New York: Harper
1959), p. 10.
6. Ibid., pp. 5-7.
7. "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism," The Theology of Paul Tillich,
eds. Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall (New York: Macmillan,
1952), p. 341. Cf. Walter Leibrecht, op. cit., p. 7.
8. E. G., Rudolf Bultmann, This World and the Beyond ([ Marburg Ser
mons ] New York: Scribner, I960); Paul Tillich, The New Being (New
York: Scribner, 1955); Paul Tillich, The Eternal Now (New York:
Scribner, 1963).
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reflects elements from Kierkegaard and Heidegger, as we have
already noted, and while Tillich's thought reflects the influence of
both of these men, they are less determinative for him.
EXISTENTIALISM: ITS MEANING AND ISSUES
Existentialism has been described as "a method of interpreting
life which is based upon an attitude of seriousness in living. "9 It
makes man central to its method and is also often called a philo
sophical anthropology. Because man alone is the highly specialized
kind of reality called existence, existentialism is sometimes referred
to as a humanism (Sartre) or a personalism (Mounier and Berdyaev).
It is a mode of thought and decision which concerns not the intellect
merely, but the whole personality. "To think existentially, therefore,
is to think not as a spectator of the ultimate issues of life and
death, but as one who is committed to a decision upon them.''^^ As
a religious philosophy, existentialism seeks to discover the charac
ter and meaning of existence (Being) itself.
Tillich admits that "theology has received tremendous gifts
from existentialism, . . . gifts not dreamed of fifty years ago or even
thirty years ago.''^^ He does not enumerate these gifts fully in this
context, but we can note at this point some of the major emphases
or issues of existentialism, many of which are discernible in the
theology of Bultmann and Tillich. Existentialism begins from the
situation of the existing individual, since the term basically implies
the primacy of existence over essence. Closely allied with the stress
upon the individual is the concept of finite freedom. Prominence is
also given to the element of tragedy in human existence, with a
further emphasis on the concept of Dread, or Anguish. The subjec
tivity of all truth is highly significant for existentialists. The home
lessness of the human spirit, the concept ofNothingness, the concept
of "Authentic Existence," and the significance of the "present
moment," the "eternal now," are further issues of existentialism.
Finally, death as an existential phenomenon is emphasized. To
several of these existential issues in the thought of Bultmann and
Tillich we now turn om: attention.
9. Christianity and the Existentialists, ed. Carl Michalson (New York:
Scribner, 1956), p. 17.
10. Hugh Ross Mackintosh, Types of Modem Theology (London: Nisbet
and Co., Ltd., 1937), p. 219.
11. Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture, ed. R. C. Kimball (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 126.
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Classic theology begins and ends with God. Modern man begins
and ends with himself. Tillich endeavors to meet modern man half
way; he begins with man, and attempts to end with God. Very central
to his theological approach is the "method of correlation," and
Tillich frankly states that
systematic theology proceeds in the following way: it
makes an analysis of the human situation out of which
the existential questions arise, and it demonstrates that
the symbols used in the Christian message are the an
swers to these questions. The analysis of the human
situation is done in terms which today are called
"existential." 12
Within the existentialist framework, "existence" and "existential"
are terms which apply only to men, not to concrete things. Though
Tillich moves beyond existence to ontology, his starting point is
man. As David E. Roberts points out:
The doctrine of man is clearly central in Paul Tillich's
theology. Each of the five parts of his system begins
with an analysis of human existence (and existence
generally) as the basis for developing a theological
question. Taken together, these passages constitute an
integral interpretation covering (1) human rationality,
(2) human finitude, (3) human sin, (4) man's living unity,
and (5) human destiny. The content of the five corre
sponding answers�Revelation, God, Christ, the Holy
Spirit, and the Kingdom of God�cannot be derived from
the questions, but their form is conditioned by the fact
that they must be relevant to the manner in which the
questions are being asked.
It should be noted that man's existence for Tillich is not in isolation
but in relation to the world in which he exists. As Roberts asserts,
"The basic starting point, in Tillich's thought, both for anthropology
and ontology, is man's awareness of the self-world correlation."!"^
We can understand li^e and the world only from the point of view of
our own individual, personal life.
Similarly, in Bultmann *s approach to the Christian faith the
pivotal point is man. He believes "man's life is moved by the
search for God because it is always moved, consciously or uncon
sciously, by the question about his own personal existence. The
12. Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1951), I, 62.
13. Kegley and Bretall, op. cit., p. 108.
14. Ibid., p. 115.
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question of God and the question of myself are identical. "15 In
reply to Karl Earth's charge that Bultmann was "substituting anthro
pology for theology," Bultmann heartily agrees: "I am trying to
substitute anthropology for theology, for I am interpreting theological
affirmations as assertions about human life. What I mean is that the
God of the Christian revelation is the answer to the vital ques-
tions."l6 His statement that to talk about God is also to talk about
man has been cited as putting a question mark concerning the tran
scendence of God, and Bultmann has sought to clarify his meaning.
"From the statement that to speak of God is to speak of myself, it
by no means follows that God is not outside the believer. This
would be the case only if faith is interpreted as a purely psycholog
ical event."! "7 while granting that God has an existence independent
of man, in Bultmann's theology it must be noted that the place where
God acts is in human existence, which means in human experience.
"We must speak of God as acting only in the sense that He acts
with me here and now . . ."18
Bultmann further insists that our understanding of God is bound
up with self-understanding. Accordingly, he declares that
the most important thing is that basic insight that the
theological thoughts of the New Testament are the un
folding of faith itself growing out of that new under
standing of God, the world, and man which is conferred
in and by faith�or, as it can also be phrased: out of
one's new self-understanding.^^
By this Bultmann means "an existential understanding of myself
which is at one with and inseparable from my understanding of God
and the World. "20 Anthropology stands at the central point of
Bultmann's theological concern. Man is both the starting point and
center of his thought.
Existentialists are anxious to safeguard and to develop the
inner freedom of the individual person. Unitedly they oppose the
two extremes which have dominated philosophical discussions of
the problem of freedom, namely, a form of determinism which is
incompatible with the conditioned character of human existence. For
this reason, "existentialists agree that man is both free and en
slaved, but the enslavement which they acknowledge and which
15. Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology (New York: Scribner,
1958), p. 53.
16. Bartsch, op. c�/.,"A Reply to the Theses of J . Schniewind," pp. 107,
108.
17. Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, op. cit., p. 70.
18. Ibid., p. 78.
1^. Theology of the New Testament (New York: Scribner, 1955) II 239
20. Ibid.
' '
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they seek to overcome is of a kind which could only befall free
beings. "21
Tillich affirms man's freedom. "Man is man because he has
freedom, but he has freedom only in polar interdependence with
destiny. "2 2 Man's "fall" involves the actualization of finite freedom
within tragic destiny. God is infinite freedom, man is finite freedom.
Man's finite freedom makes possible the transition from essence to
existence. When man becomes anxiously aware of his finite freedom,
he experiences a desire to make his freedom an actuality. Univer
sally man decides for the actualization of his freedom and falls into
estranged existence. 2 3
Sin is not only ostentation, but self-will, says Bultmann. Re
pentance means returning to God from the isolation of self-will24
The inner dividedness which Paul describes in the latter part of
Romans 7 means that man himself destroys his true self. 25 Release
comes through the obedience of faith, and "the new self-understanding
which is bestowed with 'faith' is that of freedom, in which the
believer gains life and thereby his own self. "2 6
Estrangement, Anxiety, and Despair
In Kierkegaard's view there is an infinite abyss between God,
the Holy One, and man, the sinner. The matrix of sin is fear; psycho
logically, it springs from dread or anxiety. Despair, which is taken
by Kierkegaard as the virtual equivalent of sin, is a universal
condition. Every living man is in some degree the victim of despair.
Men fear or dread when they hear the challenge of eternity, the call
to be spiritual. They despair when they refuse that call. There is
"no man in whose inner life there does not dwell an unrest, a
dispeace, a disharmony, the dread of something unknown, of some
thing on which he dare not look, a dread of the possibilities of his
own being, a dread of himself. "2 7
21. David E. Roberts, "Faith and Freedom in Existentialism" [ a study
of Kierkegaard and Sartre], Theology Today (January, 1952), VIII,
471.
22. Systematic Theology, I, 182.
23. Ibid., II, 29ff. Cf. Kegley and Bretall, op. cit., pp. 117-120.
24. Rudolf Bultmann, Primitive Christianity in its Contemporary Setting
(London: Thames and Hudson, 1956), pp. 54, 55.
25. Systematic Theology, I, 245.
26. Ibid., 331.
27. Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 237. Chapter on "The Theology of Paradox"
{S/ten Kierkegaard).
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These various existentialist factors in man's experience are
developed at length by Paul Tillich in his Systematic Theology^^
and in his book The Courage to Be.29 A summary of these salient
factors should be noted. For Tillich, the possibility of transition
from dreaming innocence to existence is experienced as temptation.
It presupposes finite freedom. Temptation also pre supposes want
and desire, man's desire to actualize or fulfill hispotentialities.lt
is a state of anxiety or indecision-the anxiety of deciding whether
to preserve his innocence or whether to experience actuality through
knowledge, power, and guilt. It is man's desire to remove himself
from the divine center and to make himself existentially the center
of himself and his world in his search for fulfillment.
Estrangement is the result of the transition from essence to
existence, the condition in which man finds himself after the "fall."
The "fall" does not refer to a specific event in history, but is a
symbol of the universal predicament of man and points to the gap
between what he is and what he ought to be. Man's "fall" involves
the actualization of finite freedom within tragic destiny. Estrange
ment is expressed as unbelief, the turning of the total self away
from God; as hubris, the elevation of the self to the center of life;
and as concupiscence, the unlimited desire to draw the whole of
one's world into oneself. The desire for knowledge, sex, wealth,
and power are symptoms of concupiscence when they have an un
limited character. Love, on the other hand, strives for the reunion
of the separated, and for Tillich, is the opposite of estrangement.
Closely allied to the factor of estrangement is "anxiety," or
"the existential awareness of nonbeing."^^ It arises out of an
awareness of being finite and conditioned, and expresses the aware
ness of being limited in time (since men must die), space, casuality,
and substance. Anxiety should not be confused with fear, though
the two are inseparable. Fear has a definite object, such as pain,
danger, and enemies, and can be conquered by action. Anxiety can
be overcome or absorbed by courage which man receives through
heritage and through reunion with God. The basic anxiety, the
anxiety of a finite being about the threat of nonbeing, cannot be
eliminated, says Tillich. It belongs to existence itself. Tillich
distinguishes three forms of anxiety: (1) the anxiety of death (2) the
anxiety of meaninglessness, and (3) the anxiety of condemnation. ^ 2
28. Systematic Theology, II, 29-78.
29. Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (New Haven: Yale University Press
1952), pp. 32-85.
30. Ibid., p. 35.
31. Ibid., p. 39.
32. Ibid., pp. 4 Iff.
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At best, life must be lived in tension, and appears to issue in
existential anxiety rather than Christian assurance.
The three types of anxiety are interwoven in such a manner that
one of them gives the predominant color, but all of them participate
m the coloring of the state of anxiety. They are fulfilled in thz
situation of despair. Despair is an ultimate or "boundary-lire"
situation, the final consequence or index of man's existence in
estrangement. 3 3 It is the point where man has come to the end of
his possibilities. It signifies the state of inescapable conflict
between what man essentially is and ought to be, and what he
actually is and cannot help ("without hope"; "no exit"). It is also
the state of meaninglessness leading to paths of self-destruction in
a vain attempt to escape (suicide). In despair, God is experienced
as standing against man in "wrath" and "condemnation. "34
The Subjectivity of Truth
The principle of spiritual inwardness, or subjectivity as it is
often called, had a determinative influence on all of Kierkegaard's
thinking. For him, truth is subjectivity, as subjectivity is truth. This
does not mean that he denied objectively encountered reality. He
simply meant that coldly objective, abstract thinking counts for
nothing by itself. As Kierkegaard expressed it in one of his most
famous dictums, "Only the truth that edifies is truth for thee."
The mood of Kierkegaard has pervaded contemporary existen
tialism. It has been carried to extreme forms of radical subjectivism.
Paul Tillich and Rudolf Bultmann have helped to prepare the way for
these radical forms by their excessive stress upon subjectivity.
Less than a year prior to Paul Tillich's death, this writer heard the
renowned theologian lecture at Transylvania College on the subject,
"Absolute and Relative Elements in Moral Decisions." Tillich
insisted emphatically that the source of a moral decision lies in
one's individual ess' ""ce. "This approach," he said, "means that
the individual must reject attempts to derive absolute values from
other sources, such as fear, expediency, social convention or ar
bitrary earthly or heavenly authorities." Furthermore, "if it [a moral
commandment ] comes from outside our essential being we have the
right to contradict it . . . Tell the young who seek moral guidance
that on the basis of a concrete situation, they are free from any
33. Ibid., p. 54.
34. Ibid., p. 58.
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formulated law." Tillich also emphasized that "God's will is ex
pressed in our essential being, our created goodness," and for that
reason "individual essence does not conflict with the notion of
obedience of God's will."3 5 These opinions from the high priest of
American theology stress subjectivity with a vengeance, and are in
sharp disjunction with the scriptural stress upon the corruption of
the human heart.
Tillich helped to spawn the radical views of Bishop John A.
T. Robinson in Honest to God and the "God-is-dead" theologians by
suggesting that the very name "God" may have to be abandoned
in order to make room for and to understand a new concept for God.
He writes:
The name of this infinite and inexhaustible depth and
ground of all being is God. That depth is what the word
God means. And if that word has not much meaning for
you, translate it, and speak of the depths of your life, of
the source of your being, of your ultimate concern, of
what you take seriously without any reservation. Perhaps,
in order to do so, you must forget everything traditional
that you have learned about God, perhaps even that word
itself. 36
There is more than a touch of irony in the circumstances leading to
the death of Paul Tillich last fall when one of the young "God-is-
dead" professors assured Tillich in a personal confrontation, "You
are our father; you have made us what we are." Tillich's ontological
conception of God as being-itself tends to depersonalize Deity.
Furthermore, he assures us that the personal God of Theism is a
symbol only. A critic's pointed question seems very pertinent:
Since we can only know God through religious symbols,
and since the validity and truth of these symbols can
in no way be judged by any ontological fact but only by
human experience and its needs, why do we require the
ontological reference at all?^^
The element of subjectivity can be observed in Bultmann's
view of history. He writes:
The meaning of history lies always in the present, and
when the present is conceived as the eschatological
present by Christian faith the meaning in history is
realized. . . Always in your present lies the meaning in
35. Lawrence Pryor, "Philosopher Says Morality Comes From Within," in
The Courier-Journal CLouisville, Ky., May 19, 1965).
36. Paul Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations (New York: Scribner
1948), p. 57.
37. "The Atheism of Paul Tillich," in Religious Experience and Truth,
ed. Sidney Hook (New York: New York University Press, 1961), p. 61.
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history, and you cannot see it as a spectator, but only
in your responsible decisions. In every moment slumbers
the possibility of being the eschatological moment. You
must awaken it. 3 8
He distinguishes two kinds of history: Historie (history as record)
and Geschichte (history as occurrence). The latter is viewed as the
dynamic history that happens here, in the present moment, in me. On
this basis many of the great events in the Christian faith are inter
preted mythologically. The event of crucifixion, for example, is not
basically the death of Jesus on Golgotha under Pontius Pilate about
30 A.D., but it is my death to sin and error. The event of resurrection
is not the raising of Jesus from the tomb; it is the message of new
life and my awakening to it. This is an existential interpretation,
with a strong emphasis on subjectivization, which actually subverts
the Gospel by the tendency to divorce it from an historical event in
the biblical record.
SUMMARY AND EVALUATION
This brief survey, though far from being exhaustive, seeks to
exhibit the existentialist features in the theology of Bultmann and
Tillich. Viewed from its broad perspective, the rise and development
of existentialism must be understood against the background of the
tragedies and deep-rooted anxieties in the past generation, partic
ularly in Europe. It is basically a protest against the pride and
optimism of Modern Man, and had its beginning in Kierkegaard's re
volt against Hegelianism, with its serene objectivity and optimistic
acceptance of the actual. For Kierkegaard, Hegel's optimistic ideal
ism was the worst possible framework in which authentic Christian
faith can be set.
On the positive side, the desire to effectively communicate the
Gospel to our generation, and the stress on personal decision in
volving commitment, and the frank assumption of personal respon
sibility, are wholesome emphases. Existentialism lends itself to
extravagances, however, and this has not been avoided by either
Tillich or Bultmann. Even the good intention of communicating the
Gospel becomes a weakness with these men. The abstract, rarified
jargon of Tillich is a fitting example. ^ 9 John Herman Randall, Jr.
reports the occasion when Tillich read a brilliant paper to a group of
38. Rudolf Bultmann, The Presence of Eternity: History and Eschatology
(New York: Harper, 1957), p. 155.
39. Cf. "A Glossary of Tillich Terms, "ed. Robert E. Chiles, in Theology
Today (April, I960), XVII, 77-89.
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professional philosophers, which included among the listeners the
distinguished representative of a very different philosophical tradi
tion and language, G. E. Moore. When it came time for Moore to
comment, he said: "Now really, Mr. Tillich, I don't think I have
been able to understand a single sentence of your paper. Won't you
please try to state one sentence, or even one word, that I can under-
stand?"40 If Tillich's terms were employed in the Lord's Prayer,
according to the Religious Research Digest, here is how it might be
re-interpreted within the framework of his theological terminology:
Our Ultimate Ground of Being, which are in the
incomprehensible realm.
Isolated by thy name.
Thy Divine Acceptance come.
Thine unknowable will be done.
On earth as it is in the New Dimension;
Give us this day the Courage To Be,
And reconcile us to thyself just as we are.
Even as we seek to be reconciled to others.
Lead us not into guilt complexes.
But deliver us from the Non-being of estrangement.
For thine is the dynamic, the fellowship, and the
Cosmic Fulfillment for ever.
Amen?4l
James Denney's firm declaration that "no man can give at once the
impression that he himself is clever and that Jesus Christ is mighty
to save"'^2 is apropos. This is not to suggest that it was Tillich's
motive to be clever, but such was the result, however. A hearer did
not come away from Tillich's lectures extolling the virtues of Jesus
Christ, the God-man, but rather talking about Paul Tillich, the erudite
and often incomprehensible man.
The most disconcerting factor in the views of Bultmann and
Tillich is their rejection of, even antipathy for, the supernatural
and miraculous elements in the Christian faith. To a large extent
th is is the burden of Bultmann's famous lecture on "New Testament
and Mythology, "43 For both Bultmann and Tillich this amounts to
40. Kegley and Bretall, op. cit. p. 133.
41. Religious Research Digest (July-Sept., 1961), I, 3.
42. Cf . James S. Stewart, Heralds of God (New York: Scribner, 1946), p.74 �
43. Bartsch, ed., op. cit. Cf. P. E. Hughes, Scripture and Myth: An Exam
ination of Rudolf Bultmann's Plea for Demythologization (London*
The Tyndale ftess, 1956).
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nothing less than a radical transformation of classical Christianity.
In addition, their rejection of biblical authority, '^'^ the preoccupation
with a humanistic center of faith, the discounting of the historical
basis and objectivity of the Christian faith, and other factors, are
the breeding ground for agnosticism and skepticism. The harvest has
already come in the radicalism of Bishop Robinson and Bishop Pi're
and the "God-is-dead" theologians. An investigation of this nature
leaves us with an increased conviction that we have in Bultmann's
and Tillich's interpretation of the Gospel something far other than
the "faith once for all delivered to the saints."
44. Cf. Frederick Sontag, "Biblical Authority and Tillich's Search for the
Ultimate," in The Journal of Bible and Religion (October, 1962),
XXX, 278-283.
45. Cf. the writer's articles in previous issues of The Asbury Seminarian:
"What is Existentialism?" (Spring-Summer, 1957), XI, 7-14; "Tillich's
Doctrines of God" (Spring-Summer, 1959), XIII, 10-17; "Rudolf
Bultmann's Existentialist Interpretation of the New Testament"
(Spring-Summer, 1963), XVII, 28-38.
